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Monetary or in-kind transfers can be used as an incentive for con-
sumers to request oﬃcial receipts for goods they purchase. A novel sys-
tem of in-kind transfers in the form of lottery tickets has recently been
introduced in China. Price subsidies (often granted through tax deduc-
tions or refunds) are also widely used. This paper extends the standard
model of commodity tax evasion for ﬁr m s( i nac o m p e t i t i v em a r k e ta n d
under the conjectural variation approach) in order to describe the eﬀects
of subsidies on tax evasion and in terms of incidence and of government
revenue. The role of search costs and of enforcement costs is also taken
into account.
JEL codes: H31, H32, K42.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In China a novel system for ﬁghting sales tax evasion has recently been intro-
duced1. To encourage customers to request oﬃcial receipts as proof of pay-
ment in the service and retail commerce sectors, local tax authorities in many
provinces have introduced a new type of receipt that doubles as a lottery ticket.
To prevent forging of receipts, businesses must purchase special, patented ma-
chines for printing them. Records of the printed receipts are automatically
transmitted to the tax authorities and are used to calculate the taxes payable
on sales. The receipts can be used as scratch cards to win small amounts of
cash, but they also serve as lottery tickets for winning larger amounts.
In the Chinese experiment, lottery receipts act as an in-kind subsidy oﬀering
incentives to consumers who request legal transactions. If the market value of
the lottery tickets is easy to establish and readily raised, the system is equivalent
to a monetary subsidy scheme. The Chinese experiment is thus an example of
an approach that relies on rewarding consumers to foster compliance in the
∗I wish to thank Mario Ferrero and Christian Traxler for helpful suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
†Dept. of Public Policy and Public Choice Polis, Univ. of Eastern Piedmont, Via
Cavour 84, 15100 Alessandria (Italy);. Phone: +39-131-283718; fax: +39-131-283704; e-mail:
carla.marchese@unipmn.it
1For a description of this system and an evaluation of its eﬀects see Wan [10].
1ﬁeld of commodity taxation. Subsidies to consumption are also often granted in
developed countries for a variety of purposes, not least of which is ﬁghting tax
evasion. Subsidies are often introduced by allowing ﬁxed percent of expenses
for speciﬁc items to be deducted from the income tax base.
This paper examines the pros and cons of the consumption-subsidy approach
and describes the eﬀects of subsidies on tax evasion and in terms of incidence and
of government revenue. After a brief overview of the standard ﬁrm tax evasion
model in Section 2, the role of monetary subsidies is discussed in Section 3. In
Section 4, in-kind subsidies are analyzed. Empirical evidence concerning the
working of subsidies is reported in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic tax evasion model
Following Cremer and Gahvari [2], Etro [4] and Cowell [1], consider a ﬁrm in
a competitive market. Production occurs at constant returns to scale and m is
the marginal and average cost. There are many identical ﬁrms: let us call x the
ﬁrm’s output and X the industry output. The product is sold at a consumer
price P.T h e r ei sa nad valorem tax at the (tax inclusive) rate t<1.
The ﬁrm can cheat the government at a total cost given by g(β)Px,w h e r e
β is the share of sales concealed and g(β) is a strictly increasing convex func-
tion. The concealment cost per unit of revenue g(β) may increase as ﬁrms seek
to evade taxes by attempting to hide or camouﬂage their activity, leading to
increasing ineﬃciency and waste2.
Audits occur with a given probability p and perfectly reveal any cheating.
Evasion is punished with a sanction which is a multiple s>0 of the evaded tax.
The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y :
{P [1 − t[1 − β (1 − p(1 + s))] − g(β)] − m}x = {P [1 − te − g(β)] − m}x
(1)
where te represents the expected tax rate. Let us assume that [1 − p(1 + s)] >
0 holds, that is, the expected return on tax evasion is positive. Let us also as-
sume that parameter values are such that full evasion does not occur, resulting
in an interior solution with reference to the share of sales concealed. From the
F.O.C. with respect to β,o n eg e t s :
∂g(β)
∂β
= t[1 − p(1 + s)] (2)
that is, the marginal cost of concealment
∂g(β)
∂β must equal the expected marginal
beneﬁt t[1 − p(1 + s)] when β is optimally chosen. The decision about tax
2One can also describe the total cost of evasion as:
f (β)βPx
where f(β) is the cost per unit of sales concealed and is strictly increasing in β.T h i sf o r m u -
l a t i o nr e d u c e st ot h eo n eu s e di nt h et e x ta sl o n ga sg(β)=f (β)β. On this topic also see
Virmani [9] and Cowell [1].
2evasion is thus separable in this model from that concerning output3.
The equilibrium price P can be calculated by considering that expected
proﬁts are zero in a competitive market equilibrium. Thus, by setting:




1 − te − g(β)
(3)
where the optimal β value is considered in the denominator. The wedge between
the consumer price P and the marginal cost grows as the expected tax rate and
the unit concealment cost increase. In equilibrium, the industry output X equals
the quantity demanded at price P and each ﬁrm earns zero expected proﬁts.
The market equilibrium is represented in Figure 1.
If ﬁrms were fully compliant, the demand net of tax would be D0.A sar e s u l t
of tax evasion, the expected tax is lower, the demand net of the expected tax is




is thus larger than without tax evasion,
while the price P00 <P0 is lower4.
3 Monetary Subsidies
Assume now that in a competitive market with tax evasion the tax administra-
tion decides to grant consumers a proportional subsidy rtPp each time a legal
transaction takes place, where r<1 and Pp is the producer price. Hence, con-
sumer demand shifts upwards. For legal transactions, the subsidy introduces a
wedge between the producer price Pp and the consumer price Pc = Pp(1 − rt).
This policy aims at rewarding consumers who "police" transactions, and can be
considered as a substitute for other interventions having the same aim, such as
increasing the probability of monitoring, increasing sanctions or punishing con-
sumers who accept illegal transactions. One potential advantage of the subsidy-
based approach is that it can help overcome asymmetries of information, since
consumers are directly involved in each transaction while auditors are not. In
fact, the proponents of this approach seek to extend and complete the chain of
conﬂicting interests characteristic of VAT. While sanctions for consumers might
be able to perform a similar role, subsidies are politically more viable.
Let us assume that the choice of making a legal transaction bears no cost
to the consumer, as, e.g., there are no enforcement costs (the psychological or
transaction costs of reporting non-compliance to the tax auditor, in order to
enforce the law). Moreover, at a cost, the tax administration can fully detect
and disregard illegitimate claims, paying subsidies only when they are actually
due.
Since under these assumptions all consumers can freely choose to engage in
legal transactions, ﬁrms resorting to illegal transactions are forced into oﬀering
3On separability in this case, also see Sandmo [8].
4Note that this is a partial equilibrium analysis that does not take into account the eﬀects








Figure 1: Market equilibrium with tax evasion
4t h ec o n s u m e ra tl e a s tt h es a m ed e a l ,i . e . t h e ym u s tb er e a d yt or e c e i v eo n l y
Pp(1 − rt) per unit of x in order to ensure indiﬀerence with respect to legal
transactions. Let us consider the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁti nt h i sc a s e :










where tE = t−tβ (1 − r − p(1 + s)) and β i ss e ta ti t so p t i m a lv a l u ei nt h i s
framework. Considering an interior solution, the F.O.C. for proﬁt maximization
with respect to β now implies that:
∂g(β)
∂β
=[ 1− r − p(1 + s)]t (5)
It is clear that the expected rate of return on tax evasion [1 − r − p(1 + s)],
w h i c hm u s tb ep o s i t i v ew h e na ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ni sr e a c h e d ,i sp u s h e dd o w na s
r increases, yielding a lower share of concealed sales β. This result is conﬁrmed
by noting that since (5) must hold at the ﬁrm’s interior optimum, one can








∂β2 > 0 by assumption (strictly increasing concealment costs), r
has a negative impact upon the share of concealed sales β.M o r e o v e r ,b ys e t t i n g
r at a value that satisﬁes:
1 − r − p(1 + s)=0
tax evasion can be eliminated altogether. While the classical theoretical pre-
scription for eliminating tax evasion is to introduce large enough sanctions, the
many potential problems caused by this approach in practice are widely known5.
Hence, subsidies to consumers may provide a better alternative. Subsidies, in
fact, work as sanctions applied with certainty on ﬁrms resorting to tax eva-
sion, since the consumers involved must receive compensation. One must bear
in mind, however, that subsidies, unlike sanctions, are paid to the consumer
and not to the tax administration: government revenue is thus aﬀected. This
problem is considered in detail in Section 3.2.
With reference to the eﬀects of subsidies upon tax evasion, note also that








which means that the eﬀects depend on the tax rate and on the shape of the
concealment cost function. The eﬀect is greater if the concealment cost function
is about ﬂat at the optimal β value. However, the concealment cost function
5See, e.g., Marchese [6].
5might grow steep if there are evasion thresholds above which visibility is so high
that hiding becomes prohibitively costly.
One may also wonder if, from a welfare point of view, subsidies received by
consumers can be considered as substitutes for government revenue. Complete
substitutability cannot be assumed, as government revenue can ﬁnance the pro-
duction of public goods or be redistributed according to a given social welfare
function, while the distribution of subsidies depends on consumption. Nonethe-
less, as subsidies do play a beneﬁcial role, the policy deserves consideration,
even from a welfare point of view.
3.1 The incidence of monetary subsidies
Let us now consider the equilibrium producer price of legal transactions Pp,
which can be calculated by setting the expected proﬁts (4) to zero:
Pp =
m
1 − t − g(β)+tβ (1 − r − p(1 + s))
=
m
1 − tE − g(β)
(8)









1 − tE − g(β)
(9)
The derivative has a positive sign. The producer price increase thus implies
that consumers never fully beneﬁt from the subsidy, that is, the subsidy is at
least partially shifted backward to suppliers. One may wonder whether there
might be backward overshifting, which would imply a consumer price increase,
i.e., ∂Pc
∂r > 0. The consumer price is given by:
Pc =
m(1 − rt)
1 − t − g(β)+tβ (1 − r − p(1 + s))
=
m(1 − rt)
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Thus overshifting occurs if the term in parenthesis in (10) is > 0.T a k i n g t h e
limits within this parenthesis immediately establishes the following:
6While β depends on r, since we are considering the maximum value function and the
optimal value β, the envelope theorem states that only the partial derivative with respect to
parameter r must be considered.





Lemma 1 implies that very large levels of tax evasion favor the occurrence
of overshifting. The intuition for this result is that the ﬁrm must collect some
extra revenue in order to be able to adjust the reward for illegal transactions
when the subsidy increases. This extra revenue is larger than the increase of
rewards, since it must cover also the expected tax and the concealment cost
per unit of revenue. When tax evasion is widespread virtually all transactions
are burdened. While the subsidy increase also negatively aﬀects tax evasion, as
shown by (7), this is only a second order eﬀect.
The market equilibrium when subsidies are introduced is illustrated in Figure
2. Agents involved in legal transactions (whose share of the market is (1 − β))
receive the transfer and their demand thus shifts up from D oﬃcial to D
0
oﬃcial cum subsidy. They pay a gross price Pp while their actual net price is
Pc. Agents involved in illegal transactions (whose market share is β)p a y 7 Pc.
I nt h ee x a m p l es h o w ni nt h eﬁgure, Pp >P>P c,w h e r eP is the equilibrium
price in absence of subsidies, i.e., in this example, the consumer price is lower
when the subsidy is granted.
Consumers are indiﬀerent as to whether the transaction is legal or illegal8.
When it is legal, there is a wedge between the price received by the ﬁrm Pp
and that (net of subsidy) paid by the consumer Pc. In the absence of tax
evasion consumers beneﬁt in full from the consumer price drop resulting from
the subsidy. With tax evasion, instead, the consumer price decreases less or even
increases, as producers bear a cost to extend the same beneﬁtt oc o n s u m e r sw h o
are partners to illegal transactions as well. In any case, whenever the subsidy
implies a drop in consumer price, a larger total amount X is produced.
3.2 Net tax revenue
Let us now consider, with reference to the basic model, the tax revenue net
of the cost for running audits c(p), which is assumed to be increasing in the
probability of audit. When no subsidy is paid, the net tax revenue is given by:
t[(1 − β)+pβ (1 + s)]PX(P) − c(p)
When the subsidy is introduced, further costs arise in order to avoid illegitimate
requests for subsidies. Since retail sales are considered, the number of trans-
actions is likely to depend on the amount of output. As each transaction can
potentially give rise to a false receipt, we assume that costs borne by the tax
administration to avoid fakes h(X (Pc)) are increasing in output. When the
subsidy is granted, the net revenue can then be written as:
t[(1 − r)(1− β)+pβ (1 + s)]PpX(Pc) − c(p) − h(X (Pc)). (11)
7In describing the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in equation (4) and afterwards we rely on the fact that
Pc = Pp (1 − rt).
8The standard assumption of amorality is followed in this paper.







Figure 2: Market equlibrium with subsidies
8Let us call f(r)=t[(1 − r)(1− β)+pβ (1 + s)] the actual marginal revenue
rate.
Lemma 2 Suﬃcient conditions for a tax revenue increase occur if: i) β → 1
and ii) the market demand is anelastic.






















∂r is given by:
∂f(r)
∂r




The ﬁrst and the last term in (12) are equal to zero since ∂X
∂Pc =0by assumption.
The second term is positive, as the producer price is increasing in the subsidy.
The third term might be either positive or negative. More speciﬁcally, the
sign of (13) depends on two components. Namely, a loss of revenue from legal
transactions, which now also involve some outlay by the government in order to
pay for the subsidy r; and a gain due to the reduction of the concealment rate
β. However, if β → 1 the ﬁrst term → 0 and thus
∂f(r)
∂r > 0.
Of course there are many other cases not taken into account by Lemma 2
in which the subsidy policy might be beneﬁcial. Consider, e.g., a case in which,
while β< <1, the reduction in tax evasion nevertheless entails beneﬁts large
enough to overcome the costs of the policy. Positive results could be achieved
even if the consumer price increase entails an output contraction. Generally
speaking, at any rate, the subsidy policy is more likely to be beneﬁcial if tax
evasion is widespread (as this reduces the amount paid out to reward legal
transactions), if the subsidy exerts an expansionary eﬀect on the market9,a n d
if the reduction of tax evasion prompted by the policy is large. What we have
termed administrative costs (i.e., h(X (Pc))), also play a very important role.
It has been assumed in fact that the administrative eﬀort is suﬃcient to ensure
that no illegitimate claims are rewarded: if this assumption is relaxed, the tax
revenue deﬁnition must be modiﬁed to take into account the corresponding
leakages of resources.
3.3 Imperfect competition
In discussing the eﬀects of monetary subsidies under imperfect competition, we
take the conjectural variations approach, according to which the industry is
composed of n identical ﬁrms, each of which makes the same conjectures about
the other ﬁrms’ reactions to her choices, resulting in a symmetrical equilibrium.
9There is, however, a trade-oﬀ between this and the former eﬀect according to Lemma 1.










where Pc (X) is the inverse market demand and
Pc(X)
1−rt is the "gross" inverse
demand that is relevant for the ﬁrm. The F.O.C. for proﬁt maximization with












= t[1 − p(1 + s) − r]
which is identical with condition (5) above. The separability of the decision
about tax evasion from that about output thus carries over to the case of im-
perfect competition, and the eﬀects of subsidies upon the share of tax evasion
β are similar to those previously discussed.
Naturally, the F.O.C. with respect to the ﬁrm’s output is diﬀerent under
imperfect and perfect competition: what takes place under diﬀerent conjectures
about the other ﬁrms’ reaction is illustrated in the Appendix. Noncompetitive
markets can thus diﬀer from competitive ones in the degree of backward shifting
of the subsidy that occurs. While the producer price is always increasing in r,
the increase can be larger or smaller than under competition. The parameters
determining the reaction are the standard ones considered in the theory of tax
incidence under imperfect competition10.
3.4 Search costs
Let us turn once again to subsidies in a competitive market, this time dropping
the assumption that consumers can always opt for legal transactions without
incurring any costs. To focus upon search costs, let us assume that enforcement
costs are prohibitively high (i.e., larger than the subsidy). Hence, consumers
will consider the option of searching for the opportunity of transacting legally.
To keep the model simple, let us assume that each consumer buys just one
unit of the good. Moreover, every consumer takes as given the value of all the
variables relevant to her choice (the Nash conjecture). It is assumed also that
all consumers bear the same cost γPp <r t P p for eliciting a new transaction
proposal, either from the same or from another ﬁrm11. Search costs are thus
described as proportional to the market producer price of the good. Since a
higher price Pp involves a smaller equilibrium output, it is also likely that it is
10See, e.g., Myles [7], Part III, Chapters 11 and 12.
11This symplifying assumption can be justiﬁed if the consumer, in order to receive a new
proposal from the same supplier, must, e.g., visit it anew.
10more diﬃcult to ﬁnd the good and that search costs are higher12.I fs e a r c h i n g
implies a net expected gain for an agent with an oﬀer of an illegal transaction
in hand, she will accept it only if she also receives at least her reservation
compensation r∗tPp, which must take a value such that:
−γPp + tPp (r − r∗)(1− β)=0.
where the l.h.s. computes the additional costs γPp and the expected addi-
tional beneﬁt tPp [r − r∗](1− β) of making a further search. Hence the reser-
vation compensation is:






The agent might, however, be discouraged form searching, i.e.
r∗tPp =0 if rt ≤
γ
(1 − β)
Note that when r∗ > 0 the reservation rate r∗ is decreasing in β, i.e., cus-
tomer compensation decreases as tax evasion increases.
In order to describe the market equilibrium in this case, let us assume that
ﬁrms, too, behave in a Nash fashion, i.e., they take as given the reservation
compensation r∗tPp currently requested for illegal transactions.
Proposition 1 If subsidies are introduced, the equilibrium share of tax evasion
is higher when consumers bear search costs. Subsidies lose any disciplining eﬀect
upon tax evasion if γ > rt(1 − β), i.e. if search costs are so high that consumers
are discouraged from searching and decide to accept illegal transactions without
requesting any compensation.
Proof. The expected proﬁtf o rt h eﬁrm in this case is:
{Pp [1 − t[1 − β (1 − r∗ − p(1 + s))] − g(β)] − m}x (14)
while, if rt ≤
γ
(1−β), r∗ =0and expected proﬁt is given by (1). From the F.O.C.
for the maximization of (14) with respect to β one gets:
∂g(β)
∂β





where β denotes the share of tax evasion taken as given by consumers in order to
determine their reservation discount. In equilibrium, β = β must hold and then,
by comparing (15) to (5) it turns out that tax evasion must be greater if there
12If one assumes instead that search costs are constant, the separability of evasion and
production decisions no longer holds. In this case, the model becomes more cumbersome,
while the main results that will be presented in this section (the vanishing eﬀect of subsidies
upon tax evasion when there are search costs and the existence of multiple equilibria) still
hold.
11are search costs. If instead γ > rt(1 − β) the F.O.C. for proﬁt maximization is
(2) and subsidies have no impact on tax evasion.
Note that the eﬀects of search costs might imply that the transfer policy
has a negative impact upon tax revenue; if the eﬀects in terms of reduction of
tax evasion are negligible, the main implication of the policy is likely to be the
outlay of resources in order to ﬁnance transfers for legal transactions. Only the
expansionary eﬀects of the policy on the economy output might mitigate these
consequences upon tax revenue.
To further assess the role of search costs, note that in equilibrium the F.O.C.
(15) can be rewritten as:







This condition implies that multiple equilibria are possible, i.e., more than one
level of tax evasion share β is viable13 (see Figure 3). This eﬀect stems from
network externalities: whenever a ﬁrm decides to evade, it originates a positive
externality for the whole set of suppliers, as the search costs for the customers
increase and the compensation requested for accepting an illegal transaction
falls. As typically happens in these cases, once a critical mass of tax evasion is
reached, it can jump to much larger values. Hence for a given γ value there might
be a small share of tax evasion β with low values of both the opportunity cost of
search and concealment costs, or a large β value with the opposite implications.
The Nash conjecture implies, however, that ﬁrms are not able to internalize the
network eﬀects.
However, in non competitive markets where suppliers are able to collude,
they might internalize the positive externality originated by illegal deals, thus
reaching equilibria characterized by widespread tax evasion.
A second possible scenario is that in which enforcement costs ζ per unit of
expenditure, which for the sake of simplicity are assumed to be constant and
equal to marginal costs, are not prohibitive as they are lower than rt.I nt h i s
case enforcement costs would become relevant at the evasion level β for which
γ
(1−β) ≥ ζ. Above this threshold consumers stop searching and report to tax
auditors. The compensation that must be paid to those who enter an illegal
transaction per unit of expenditure would thus become rt− ζ.
4 In-kind transfers
Let us now consider the case in which the government decides to encourage
legal transactions by introducing an in-kind transfer rather than a monetary
subsidy, i.e., it oﬀers consumers participating in legal transactions a quantity
tPpx of good θ 6= x. It is also assumed in this section that the market for
good x is competitive and that the consumer bears no cost in opting for a legal
transaction.
13The following values of the parameters have been used to draw Figure 3: t =0 .4, r =0 .9,
s =0 .8, p =0 .01,w h i l eg (β)=0 .2β2.
12Figure 3: Share of tax evasion β as a function of search costs
As long as there is a market price for good θ and the transaction costs for
reselling it are negligible, the analysis in Section 3 directly applies, as the in-
kind transfer has a clear-cut monetary value. If, instead, one or both of these
conditions are lacking, the ﬁrm faces the problem of compensating those who
participate in illegal transactions. The ﬁrm might resort to the supply of a
closely substitutive good, in order to give a gift to those who participate in
illegal transactions, at conditions that parallel those of the legal market. In the
example of the lottery mentioned in the Introduction, an illegal gambling system
might provide this opportunity. The likelihood of such an evolution depends on
the costs of supplying the substitute good, which could, e.g., be low if an illegal
market already exists and has gained credibility and if enforcement against it is
mild. In-kind compensations in terms of goods which are not close substitutes
might involve high transaction costs. They thus seem rather unlikely, at least
under the assumption of a competitive market for good x, in which the supplier
has no customer base and market power to exploit.
If no substitute good can be supplied, monetary compensation must be paid
to those who accept illegal transactions. The compensation cannot be lower
than the marginal willingness to pay for good θ. To discuss the implications
of this approach in a simple framework, let us assume that consumers cannot
buy neither sell14 good θ, but can only receive it as a reward for opting for
14Because no market exists, due, e.g., to prohibitive transaction costs, legal barriers to entry,
etc.
13a legal transaction. Moreover, each consumer h makes an identical and small
expenditure for good x,s ot h a ttPpx ≤ 1. The quantity of good θ to which the
customer is entitled is thus marginal, and hence it seems reasonable to assume
that each agent’s demand price (equal to the willingness to accept) is constant
within the relevant interval. The compensation requested by each consumer for
an illegal transaction is thus chtPpx,w h e r ech is the unit compensation. Let
us assume that the distribution of ch is uniform and lies on the interval [0,1].
Good θ is produced by the government at a constant marginal cost δ.I t i s
assumed that at least some consumers have a willingness to accept larger than
the marginal cost δ, i.e., there is a e ch ≤ 1 such that e ch >δ , or, equivalently, it
is assumed that δ<1. Let us also assume that each ﬁrm producing x behaves
according to a Nash conjecture, i.e., it takes as given the unit compensation
c∗
h observed in the market. Hence it chooses its evasion share β in a fashion






h − p(1 + s)
¤
t (17)
Proposition 2 If in-kind transfers are introduced and there are no search costs,
ceteris paribus the tax evasion share β i ss m a l l e rt h a ni nt h ea b s e n c eo ft r a n s f e r s
of any type. In-kind transfers outperform money subsidies in ﬁghting tax evasion
as long as the value attributed to good θ by the marginal agent accepting an illegal
transaction is larger than its marginal cost for the government.
Proof. In equilibrium, the compensation paid for illegal transactions must be
equal to the marginal demanded compensation. Under the assumption that the
requested compensation is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, β repre-
sents both Pr(0 ≤ ch ≤ β) and the marginal demanded compensation. Hence:
c∗
h = β (18)
Thus condition (17) in equilibrium becomes:
∂g(β)
∂β
+ βt =[ 1− p(1 + s)]t
which implies a smaller tax evasion share than when condition (2) applies. This
proves the ﬁrst statement. With reference to the comparison with money trans-
fers, if c∗
h = β ≥ e ch >δ , the government can induce ﬁr m st op a yal a r g e r
compensation for illegal transactions by resorting to the in-kind transfer than
by setting r = δ.
Condition (18) implies that the larger the share of illegal transactions β,t h e
larger is the compensation demanded by the marginal consumer. If the share
of tax evasion is small, ﬁrms might conduct illegal transactions with agents
whose evaluation of θ is low, while when there is a larger share of tax evasion
even agents with larger demand prices for good θ must be involved. Note also
that in this scenario each ﬁrm’s decision to evade taxes gives rise to a kind
of negative externality for the group of suppliers as a whole, as it pushes up
14the compensation that must be paid to all consumers who participate in illegal
transactions. The disciplining eﬀect of the increase of the compensation, which
operates in this framework, is thus reinforced by the fact that ﬁrms are not able
to internalize the negative externality.
With in-kind transfer the zero-proﬁt condition becomes:
{Pp [1 − t[1 − β (1 − c∗
h − p(1 + s))] − g(β)] − m}x =0 (19)
By substituting (18) into (19) and solving for Pp one gets:
Pp =
m
1 − t − g(β)+tβ(1 − p(1 + s)) − tβ2 (20)
In this framework, the larger the share of tax evasion β,t h el a r g e r 15 is Pp.T h i s
eﬀect is explained by the increasing compensation requested by the agents who
participate in illegal transactions when tax evasion increases, and represents a
kind of self-adjusting mechanism that pushes the tax base upward when tax
evasion increases which is not available under monetary transfers.
All in all, in-kind subsidies which oﬀer to the tax administration the pos-
sibility of exploiting some market power seem more eﬀective than monetary
transfers. This is due to the fact that in-kind subsidies introduce a kind of
pure bundling, as consumers can receive good θ only if they legally buy good
x. When Proposition 2 applies, good θ is rationed and the tax administration
exploits the consumer’s surplus in order to ﬁght tax evasion. However, since
good θ is supplied in a less than eﬃcient quantity, there is an eﬃciency loss.
But if good θ entails negative externalities, as in the example of lottery tickets,
one may deem the social marginal cost of θ to be larger than the private one,
and that some justiﬁcation for rationing exists.
The analysis developed in Section 3.4 with reference to the role of enforce-
ment and search costs can clearly be extended to the case of in-kind transfers.
In this case, too, one can envisage a reduction of the compensation needed to
induce customers to accept illegal transactions when they face opportunity costs
of search or enforcement costs. Nevertheless, the conclusions reached with refer-
ence to the relatively better performance of in-kind subsidies are likely to extend
to this case. On the other hand, if the market for good x is noncompetitive and
suppliers are able to set compensations for illegal transactions on an individual
basis, the role of in-kind subsidies is signiﬁcantly depotentiated. In a perfectly
discriminating monopoly, under the assumptions considered so far about the ch
distribution, in-kind subsidies would, however, still outperform monetary ones












[1 − t − g (β)+tβ(1 − p(1 + s)) − tβ2]
2 .
The term in squared brakets in the numerator is 0 as each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt according
to condition (17), and this also holds in equilibrium. Thus the term in curly brackets is




chdch >δ β= rβ,t h a ti si f :
1
2
β2 >δ β= rβ
β>2δ =2 r.
i.e., if tax evasion is so widespread that the equilibrium compensation for illegal
transactions is two times the marginal cost of θ.
5 Empirical evidence about refunds and in-kind
prizes
To ﬁght VAT tax evasion some developing countries have introduced a refund
system for consumers who exhibit receipts.
Berhan and Jenkins [3] study the working of this system in Northern Cyprus
and in Bolivia. In Northern Cyprus the scheme has been in use since 1996. The
refund was 5% of the taxable purchases until 2000 and 2.5% thereafter, while
the standard VAT rate is 13%. Purchases claimed must not surpass a threshold
(the monthly salary for employees). Employers collect the receipts for their
employees and claim the refunds on their behalf.
In Bolivia, since 1986 there has been a withholding tax on wages, salaries
and pensions, introduced with the aim of reinforcing the working of VAT. Con-
sumers deduct the VAT paid on purchases of goods and services, and thus the
withholding tax has zero expected net revenue.
Berhan and Jenkins [3] ﬁnd that these systems are burdened with very large
administration and compliance costs, both in comparison with the VAT proceeds
and with the corresponding costs of other taxes in the two countries. The
process of collecting and verifying claims is extremely time consuming, and the
net beneﬁts for taxpayers are low. Moreover, the method is vulnerable to illicit
practices. In Northern Cyprus this mainly consists in the collection of receipts
issued to foreigners, students, etc., who cannot claim their own refunds. In
Bolivia, instead, there is a black market where false receipts are also sold, at a
p r i c ea r o u n d1 %o ft h e i rf a c ev a l u e .T h e Bolivian system seems to work badly
overall, yet abolishing it would hurt some groups and therefore does not seem
politically viable. Past attempts at reforms aimed at cancelling the refunds, and
thus at transforming the withholding tax into a revenue producing tax (while
giving up potential beneﬁts on VAT), have resulted in riots.
The Chinese tax lottery experiment began in 1998, and has progressively
been extended to include about 8% of districts or cities. It has also to include
not only restaurants, beauty salons and real estate agencies but a number of
other services and retail sales as well. The experiment has been widely reported
on by the media in China. According to Wan [10] and to the sources quoted
16therein, it has had a positive impact upon business tax16 revenue and upon the
growth of total tax revenue.
The use of lottery tickets in the battle against tax evasion is also being tried
out elsewhere in Asia. Lotteries are also often used in the private sector as
a marketing device. For example, banks in Latin America oﬀer lottery-linked
deposit accounts. Those who keep the account for a given period participate in
lotteries for small and large prizes. According to Gillén and Tschoegl [5] these
accounts are a cheaper source of funds for banks than other accounts. Lotteries
are particularly appealing for low income agents, and behave as inferior goods.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Reliance on money or in-kind subsidies as an incentive for consumers to request
compliance with sales taxes rests on the assumption that it provides a less costly
solution than auditing ﬁrms. In fact, consumers have an informative advantage
over tax auditors in that they are necessarily in frequent contact with suppliers.
While this assumption is reasonable, one must also factor in the costs and the
many possible undesired eﬀects stemming from this approach. When the system
works smoothly, it is likely to give rise to some kind of "revenge by the market"
through the increase of gross or even net prices. The payment of subsidies, which
often takes the form of tax deductions, involves high administrative costs. New
forms of cheating might appear. For example consumers might try to cash in
on subsidies even when they are not entitled to receive them. We whish also to
underline how important it is to consider the context in which the subsidy is
introduced. If consumers bear no cost from opting for a legal transaction, the
impact of subsidies is likely to be signiﬁcant. Tax evasion becomes less proﬁtable
and decreases. If, instead, consumers bear the brunt of costs for reporting
violations to the authorities, subsidies might induce them to search for vendors
willing to participate in legal transactions. As, however, searching is also costly,
the opportunity value of the subsidy decreases. Hence the aforementioned eﬀects
of subsidies on tax evasion and prices are diluted and, at the limit, disappear.
Multiple equilibria can arise.
The resort to in-kind transfers seems to have one advantage over monetary
transfers. At least some consumers are likely to have a large demand price for
the good chosen for the in-kind transfer, larger than its marginal cost: even if
tax evasion is widespread they will request a legal transaction notwithstanding
enforcement or search costs. In this framework, each ﬁrm’s decision to evade
entails a negative externality, as it contributes to exhausting the pool of agents
less interested in the good and ready to accept an illegal deal for low compen-
sation. On the other hand, the advantages of the in-kind approach are related
to the existence of a market power that the tax administration can exploit and
to the resort to a form of bundling, which in general involves an eﬃciency loss.
Concerning the type of good oﬀered, the recent experiment with lottery
receipts in China seems promising. In this case, on the one hand the market
16This is a turnover tax paid on gross receipts.
17for gambling is routinely regulated and thus the tax administration is likely to
posses some market power, while on the other hand rationing consumption is a
minor concern as long as gambling produces negative externalities. A further
advantage over monetary transfers is the savings in monitoring costs: only the
receipts of lottery winners must be collected and checked17, whereas systems
based on refunds usually involve huge costs just for handling a large number
of receipts. From the point of view of equity, so long as lotteries are inferior
goods they should give rise to transfers that have a larger value for the poor
who receive them. On the other hand, among the drawbacks to the lottery
scheme, one must include the possible substitution eﬀect upon the demand for
other forms of gambling supplied by the government.
A more general caveat with reference to both monetary and in-kind trans-
fers is related to the potential for crowding-out eﬀects in the realm of intrinsic
(moral) motivations for paying taxes and obeying ﬁs c a ll a w s . T h i si sam a t -
ter for concern, since, in a certain sense, compliance becomes conditional on a
compensation.
A Appendix










where tE is given by:
tE = t{1 − β[1 − p(1 + s) − r]}
while X is the industry output and is given by:








where λ = n corresponds to monopoly pricing, λ =1to Cournot behavior and
λ =0to the Bertrand equilibrium entailing marginal cost pricing.











1 − tE − g(β)
¤
− m =0
where a prime stands for the derivative.
17On this topic, see also [3].
18Under a symmetrical equilibrium all ﬁrms produce the same quantity, i.e.:
X = nxi

































































































[1 − tE − g(β)][1 + µ(1 − E)]
(23)
provided that the stability condition [1 + µ(1 − E)] > 0 holds. Moreover, from








[1 − tE − g(β)]
= Pcc








t[1 − p(1 + s) − r]
Since the F.O.C. with respect to β implies that:
t[1 − r − p(1 + s)] =
∂g(β)
∂β
one can simplify as in the r.h.s. of (21).










[1 − tE − g(β)][1 + µ(1 − E)]
(24)
Note that (24) reduces to (10) under perfect competition, as in this case λ =
0=µ. It turns out that backward overshifting is larger under imperfect than





Within this interval, overshifting is larger the larger are E and µ.N o t et h a tµ
is larger the less competitive is the market. On the other hand, when E<1,a
non competitive market is less prone to overshifting than a competitive one. As
an example, consider a linear demand, i.e., E =0 , and a monopolistic market,
i.e., µ =1 : in this case the shifting is 1
2 of that occurring under competition.
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